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7Abstract :  The Battle of Flers-
Courcelette is chiefly remembered 
as the combat introduction of 
tanks. The prevailing historiography 
maligns their performance as a 
lacklustre debut of a weapon which 
held so much promise for offensive 
warfare. However, unit war diaries 
and individual accounts of the battle 
suggest that the tank assaults of 15 
September 1916 were far from total 
failures. This paper thus re-examines 
the role of tanks in the battle from 
the perspective of Canadian, British 
and New Zealand infantry. It finds 
that, rather than disappointing Allied 
combatants, the tanks largely lived 
up to their intended role of infantry 
support.
The Battle of Flers-Courcelette stands out in the broader memory 
of the First World War due to one 
principal factor: the debut of the 
tank. The battle commenced on 15 
September 1916 as a renewed attempt 
by the general officer commanding 
(GOC) the British Expeditionary 
Force (BEF) General Douglas Haig 
to break through German lines on 
the Somme front. Flers-Courcelette 
shares many familiar attributes 
with other Great War engagements: 
troops advancing across a shell-
blasted landscape towards thick 
German defensive lines to capture 
a few square kilometres of barren 
territory at the cost of thousands 
of lives. The successful assault on 
Courcelette by the 2nd Canadian 
Division is typically regarded as 
a victory in Canadian memory of 
the war. In contrast, British forces 
attacking to the east did not achieve 
their intended breakthrough, and 
the battle is viewed in the UK as 
a minor advance.1 The tanks’ first 
combat deployment ultimately 
overshadowed the hard infantry 
fighting of 15 September in the 
broader memory of the Great War. 
 Nearly all of the works that 
discuss the Battle of Flers-Courcelette 
highlight the debut of the tank as 
the central feature of the battle. 
For example, the chapter on the 15 
September attack in Martin Gilbert’s 
The Battle of the Somme (2006) is entitled 
“The arrival of the tanks: ‘We are 
feeling top dogs.’” Similarly, Robin 
Prior and Trevor Wilson’s The Somme 
(2005) discusses Flers-Courcelette 
in a chapter entitled “Lumbering 
Tanks: The Battle of 15 September.” 
Such works are in agreement about 
two principal conclusions: the attack 
was not a stirring success, but it 
did showcase the potential for the 
tank as an offensive weapon. The 
British official history discusses the 
many shortcomings of the tank on 
15 September but concedes that the 
battle was a “valuable tryout” for the 
possibilities of tank assaults.2 J.F.C. 
Fuller was similarly unkind about the 
tanks’ initial performance. In his Tanks 
in the Great War, Fuller wrote that the 
15 September attack was “from the 
point of view of tank operations, not 
a great success.”3 He, too, argued that 
the silver lining in the tanks’ poor 
showing at Flers-Courcelette was that 
the battle served as a field test to hone 
tank tactics and design for future 
deployment.4 One of the harshest 
verdicts on the tanks’ debut comes 
from the Canadian official history. 
It commented that “on the whole…
the armour in its initial action failed 
to carry out the tasks assigned to it.” 
It acknowledged, however, that the 
“All Arms” co-ordination of tanks, 
artillery, infantry and aircraft was not 
yet familiar to BEF commanders.5 
 An examination of the battle 
from the infantry’s perspective 
suggests a more nuanced outcome. 
Despite the high hopes of General 
Haig and others for their effect on the 
battlefield, tanks were not expected 
to be decisive strategic weapons in 
their early operations. Rather, they 
were intended to serve as tactical 
accessories to the infantry assault. 
Infantry units were instructed prior 
to 15 September that tanks would 
be valuable in surmounting enemy 
machine gun posts and strongpoints, 
but were in no way to be depended 
upon for the advance.6 Flers-
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8Courcelette was not the harbinger 
of fast, offensive armoured thrusts, 
but of tactical support for infantry 
attacks. 
 The Canadian Corps and British 
XV Corps witnessed the greatest 
range of tank performance at Flers-
Courcelette and will serve as the 
focal point of analysis for this paper. 
Out of five corps at the battle, 
these two experienced the most 
success with tanks and feature the 
best-documented analysis of tank 
operations on 15 September. 
 As tanks were designed from 
the outset to support infantry attacks 
across no-man’s-land, the yardstick 
for tank success should be based 
upon how the infantry fared.7 Much 
of the primary analysis for this paper 
will therefore rest upon infantry 
battalion war diaries which contain 
intelligence and after-action reports 
and offer candid examinations of 
tank performance. A number of 
infantrymen from Flers-Courcelette, 
moreover, left eyewitness accounts 
of the tanks’ performance, which 
supplement the war diaries with 
a human dimension of combat. 
These documents must be used with 
caution. An infantry unit’s evaluation 
of tank performance was often 
narrowly linked to the fate of the foot 
soldiers – low casualties counting as 
success, and high casualties as failure. 
Inconsistencies and biases of both the 
war diaries and personal accounts 
may be identified and balanced by 
reference to more broadly based 
secondary sources, such as official 
histories and analytical studies.
 Although at Flers-Courcelette 
most of the tanks suffered mechanical 
breakdown or battle damage and 
failed to influence events, some tanks 
rendered valuable assistance to the 
infantry in surmounting German 
strongpoints. Both eventualities were 
anticipated and prepared for by the 
attacking infantry units. This paper 
will show that the tanks largely lived 
up to their intended tactical support 
role at Flers-Courcelette. 
Strategic Context
As the Great War entered its third year in January 1916 both the 
Entente and Central Powers were 
intent on smashing through enemy 
lines and ending the stalemate on 
the Western Front. The British and 
French high commands agreed to 
a massive joint offensive along the 
inter-army boundary in the Picardy 
region in May-June.8 These plans 
were disrupted by the German 
drive towards Verdun in late 
February which aimed to inflict 
such horrendous losses that the 
French would be forced to sue for 
peace and thereby isolate the BEF.9 
Verdun descended into a savage 
battle of attrition. The French suffered 
an estimated 115,000 casualties by 
May.10
 Desperate to alleviate the strain 
on Verdun, French commander-in-
chief General Joseph Joffre pressured 
the British to continue with the 
planned offensive in Picardy, north 
of the Somme River. Haig protested 
that his forces would not be ready 
for a major assault until 15 August. 
This was unacceptable to Joffre 
and he persuaded Haig to commit 
to a 1 July start date.11 The carnage 
at Verdun meant that the French 
contribution to the Somme offensive 
would necessarily be decreased, but 
Haig still maintained hopes for a 
breakthrough on the Western Front.
 The British attack went in as 
scheduled in the morning of 1 July 


















The battle of Flers-Courcelette saw the first use of tanks in battle.  C.4 (Chablis), a Mark I (female) tank, assigned to support the 6th 
Canadian Infantry Brigade, was disabled early in the battle by a shell which disabled its track (see the damage at the rear of the tank).
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9Here, C.5 (Crème de Menthe), a Mark I tank traverses the Courcelette battlefield, September 1916.  C.5 was a male variant armed 
with two naval 6-pounder guns and four Vickers machine guns. The female variant replaced the 6-pounders with two additional Vickers 
machine guns.  The two-wheeled trailer pulled behind the tank was a steering tail used to help control the direction of the vehicle.
slaughter. The combination of deep 
German entrenchments and dense 
barbed wire that survived the long 
British artillery bombardment, 
coupled with lack of surprise meant 
that the defenders were well-
prepared. Over 19,000 British and 
Empire soldiers were killed and some 
38,000 wounded on the first day of 
the attack alone.12 Undeterred by the 
scale of the losses, Haig continued 
to push. By late August, roughly 
eight square kilometres of German-
held territory were captured at a 
cost of 100,000 British casualties.13 
German strongholds such as those 
at Thiepval and High Wood, and 
the Quadrilateral trench network 
continued to elude capture even after 
months of horrific fighting. 
 By September Haig was ready 
once again to renew the offensive, 
believing that German morale and 
troop strength were nearing the 
point of collapse. He decided to 
strike along an 11 kilometre front 
extending roughly from Thiepval in 
the east to Combles in the southwest.14 
This stretch of the German line 
represented their “Third Position,” 
a stout network of trenches and 
dugouts that were begun in February 
1916. Haig hoped that breaking 
through this position would finally 
crack the German lines.15
 The  pr imary dr ive  of  the 
offensive was to be undertaken 
by General Sir Henry Rawlinson’s 
Fourth Army, which was tasked with 
breaking through three primary lines 
of German defences and capturing 
the villages of Martinpuich, Flers and 
Gueudecourt on the first day. The 
Canadian Corps of the neighbouring 
Reserve Army would support this 
drive by attacking Courcelette. After 
the infantry had broken in to the 
German lines the cavalry would be 
committed for a drive on Bapaume 
and the less-comprehensively 
defended rear areas.16 In all, ten 
divisions were allocated for the 
assault against the five German 
divisions holding the sector.17 The 
attack was scheduled to begin on 15 
September.
The Tanks
Haig used every means at his disposal to increase the 
possibility of success for this second 
major effort of the Somme offensive. 
The centerpiece of the 15 September 
attack was to be roughly 50 rhombus-
shaped Mark I tanks. By the summer 
of 1916 several companies of tanks 
were training in Great Britain under 
a shroud of secrecy. There were 
two principal variants of the Mark 
I: the male and female. Males were 
armed with four machine guns 
and two 6-pounder guns and were 
designed to engage German positions 
obstructing the infantry advance. 
The small caliber of a 6-pounder 
could not replace the devastating 
power of an artillery barrage, but 
it was powerful enough to knock 
out machine gun posts and enfilade 
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were equipped with six machine 
guns to protect the males against 
German infantry. Females would 
always accompany male tanks into 
battle.19 These Mark I tanks could 
move approximately two kilometres 
per hour over ground broken up by 
trenches.20 
  Haig initially wanted to include 
tanks in the 1 July attack, but they 
were not available in sufficient 
numbers.21 His patience for the 
tanks’ debut grew thin by September, 
however, and he decided to deploy 
“C” and “D” Companies of the Heavy 
Section, Machine Gun Corps (as the 
tank force was then known) while 
many of their fellow tankers were 
still in transit to France. In the event, 
49 out of 150 available tanks of the 
Heavy Section were integrated into 
the 15 September offensive.22 
 Haig’s decision to employ 
whatever tanks were available 
directly contradicted the advice 
of many of the tank’s designers. 
Winston Churchill was an opponent 
of the modest deployment of tanks 
on the Somme, both before and 
after the fact. While serving as First 
Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill 
was a key figure in the early 
development of the tank, directing 
the Landships Committee, the body 
that developed the tank. Despite 
being ousted from government due to 
the Dardanelles fiasco in November 
1915, he maintained an interest in 
the machines’ deployment. In a 
memorandum dated 7 January 1916, 
he warned that “none should be 
used until all can be used at once.”23 
Churchill ’s  memorandum was 
distributed to the War Committee 
and Field Marshal Sir John French, 
Haig’s predecessor as GOC of the 
BEF.24 Partial deployment of the 
tanks, Churchill was convinced, 
would negate both their priceless 
surprise value and their potential for 
a mass assault. His views were shared 
by another early tank enthusiast, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Ernest Swinton. 
In a June 1915 memorandum, Swinton 
had warned French and GHQ that 
“there should be no preliminary 
efforts with a few machines, the result 
of which would give the scheme 
away.”25
 These criticisms of a disgraced 
politician and a relatively junior 
officer seem important in hindsight. 
The pressures on Haig to renew 
the offensive, however, made it 
hard to delay deployment of a new 
assault weapon from which so much 
was expected. Indeed, Haig was 
determined to employ tanks to 
breathe new life into the stagnating 
Somme offensive. His diary entry 
for 11 August showed impatience 
with the length of time it took to 
transport tanks, crews and spare 
parts from England to France: “I have 
been looking forward to obtaining 
decisive results from the use of these 
‘Tanks’ at an early date.”26 On 22 
August he wrote that “I cannot wait 
any longer for [tanks], and it would 
be folly not to use every means at 
my disposal in what is likely to be 
our crowning effort for this year.”27 
Christy Campbell, in his recent study 
of the tank action at Flers, argues 
that Haig’s conduct reflected the 
“recklessness of a man looking for a 
last chance.”28 Such criticism neglects 
the immense pressure on Haig to 
deliver tangible territorial gains to 
balance the awful bloodletting since 
1 July. The tanks would receive their 
first taste of combat on 15 September 
1916. 
Preliminaries
The groundwork for the Battle of Flers-Courcelette was similar 
to the preparations for the 1 July 
attack and the 15 September assault 
was similarly intended to achieve a 
decisive breakthrough of the main 
German lines with exploitation by 
cavalry.29 A heavy bombardment 
began at 0630 hours on 12 September 
and continued unabated until 15 
September.30 This attack featured 
another experimental approach 
– the creeping barrage. A sharp 
bombardment was to deluge the 
German front as the infantry went 
“over the top” to catch the defenders 
out of their deep dugouts as they 
prepared to resist the assault. The 
barrage was then to drop back into 
no-man’s-land and move forward 
at “lifts” of 45 metres per minute to 
provide the attacking infantry with a 
shield of shrapnel.31 To avoid hitting 
the tanks, 90 metre wide lanes would 
be left untouched by the barrage for 
the tanks to advance in sections of 
three machines approximately five 
minutes ahead of the III, XV and XIV 
British Corps of the Fourth Army.32 
 The majority of tanks allocated 
to the attack were assigned to Fourth 
Army for its drive on Gueudecourt. 
Out of the 49 tanks of “C” and “D” 
Companies, 17 were assigned to XIV 
British Corps for its attack on Ginchy 
and the Quadrilateral, eight were 
allocated to III British Corps for the 
assault on High Wood, and 17 were 
to work with XV British Corps in the 
capture of Flers and Martinpuich. 
Seven were assigned to the Reserve 
Army for the assault of Courcelette.33 
The fateful decision to leave lanes 
untouched by the creeping barrage 
open for the tanks meant that many 
Fourth Army formations were 
dependent on the tanks to crush 
German wire and strongpoints ahead 
of the infantry.34 In some sectors of 
the attack, the tanks were pressed 
into a more active role in the opening 
assault than originally intended. In 
the event that the untested machines 
failed to keep up with the advance, 
the attacking infantry would be left 
dreadfully exposed to German fire 
without the protection of either tanks 
or barrage. 
 Despite Haig’s optimism about 
the tanks’ capabilities, the small 
number of machines, and the fact that 
they were untested in battle, meant 
that they were treated as an adjunct to 
the infantry’s assault. An operations 
order for the 12th Battalion of the 
East Surrey Regiment, for example, 
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stipulated that the tanks’ “role is to 
destroy the hostile Machine Guns 
and Strong Points, and clear the way 
for the infantry.”35 The infantry were 
instructed to call for help from tanks 
by signalling with their rifles and 
helmets in the event that they were 
held up by stiff German resistance. 
The attack was not to depend on tank 
assistance. The same operations order 
noted carefully that “should the tanks 
become out of action our Infantry are 
on no account to wait for them,” and 
the infantry would keep up the pace 
of the advance to “derive the benefit 
of the artillery barrage.”36 
 The last-minute arrival  of 
tanks in France meant there was 
little time for training with the 
infantry. Some formations, such as 
the British 56th Division, were able 
to conduct battalion-sized exercises 
before 15 September. These small 
training exercises were not common, 
however, and some units were only 
able to send small groups of officers 
to observe tanks practicing behind 
the lines.37 Many prudent battalion 
commanders remained skeptical of 
the tanks’ potential worth on the 
battlefield. An order for the 27th 
Battalion, Canadian Expeditionary 
Force (CEF) commented that “two 
‘tanks’ will likely be told off to co-
operate with us but our plans are to 
be made irrespective of them.”38
 Such skepticism was not shared 
by many of the combat troops who 
were extremely curious about the 
characteristics of the new weapons. 
Those soldiers who witnessed 
tanks exercising shortly before 
the batt le  were awed despite 
their ungainly appearance and 
ponderous movement. Captain 
Duncan Macintyre, a staff officer 
serving with the 28th Battalion 
CEF, witnessed a tank exercise near 
the front on 13 September. After 
seeing the tank manoeuvre over 
shell holes and trenches behind the 
line, Macintyre wrote in his diary 
that “we felt they would make a big 
difference to our side in any fight 
they were in.”39 Major Agar Adamson 
of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian 
Light Infantry (PPCLI) wrote to 
his wife on 14 September that “we 
have some wonderful new devices 
for putting it over the Germans…
the new ‘ships’ look promising.”40 
Private Edgar Goddard, also of the 
28th Battalion, wrote that he and his 
The shell-scarred Somme battlefield.  This photo was taken during operations on 15 September 1916 and shows the ground over 
which the Canadians attacked.  The ruins of Courcelette are visible amongst the shell fire and battered tree line.
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friends were “chuckling over the 
surprise that the Germans would 
get the next day” after seeing tanks 
parked behind the lines before the 
attack.41 Whether these writings 
convey a sincere belief in the tank’s 
potential or a forced optimism for 
home-front consumption is difficult 
to say. Nevertheless, these statements 
suggest the soldiers were confident 
that the new machines would at the 
least administer a rude shock to the 
enemy.
The Canadian Corps Attack
Lieutenant-General Sir Julian Byng’s Canadian Corps was 
tasked with anchoring the left flank 
of the larger Fourth Army drive by 
capturing the village of Courcelette 
and holding it against German 
counterattacks.  Major-General 
Richard Turner’s 2nd Canadian 
Division was ordered to capture the 
fortifications in front of Courcelette: 
Sugar Trench, Candy Trench and a 
fortified sugar beet refinery known 
as the Sugar Factory. These defences 
comprised an interconnected series 
of dugouts, machine gun posts and 
barbed wire manned by the German 
45th Reserve Division.42 They were 
between 400 to 800 metres from 
the Canadian front line.43 The 5th 
Canadian Infantry Brigade (CIB) 
was held in reserve for the capture of 
Courcelette itself, another 800 to 1,200 
metres distant, if German defences 
were breached by the 4th and 6th 
CIBs in the initial assault. Major-
General Louis Lipsett’s 3rd Canadian 
Division was to attack Fabeck Graben 
trench in order to protect the left flank 
of the 2nd Division.44 
 The six tanks, plus one in reserve, 
allocated to the Reserve Army 
were assigned to the 2nd Canadian 
Division.45 These tanks of Heavy 
Section’s “C” Company were divided 
into two detachments of three tanks 
and were parcelled out to the 4th and 
6th CIBs for a converging attack on 
the Sugar Factory.46 The tanks were 
to advance alongside the infantry at 
zero hour, and thus no gaps were 
left in the barrage as on the fronts 
of the British corps where the tanks 
moved out ahead of the infantry. 
Zero hour was set for 0620 hours on 
15 September.
 The infantry battalion war diaries 
are curiously reticent about the 
role of tanks during the attack on 
Courcelette. The fact that only six 
tanks participated in the Canadian 
attack meant that most troops would 
not have the opportunity to fight 
alongside them. Notwithstanding 
the excellent precision and detail of a 
few soldiers’ accounts, most primary 
documentation of the Canadians’ 
experience with tanks at Courcelette 
is vague and difficult to relate to 

















































Top right: Crème de Menthe (C.5), 
surrounded in a cloud of smoke from its 
engine, crosses the battlefield.
Bottom right: A close-up of the sponson 
on the side of the hull of a Mark I tank 
(male). A German shell has penetrated 
the armour on the shield of the 6-pounder 
gun likely putting it out of action.
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Campbell’s Band of Brigands and 
Trevor Pidgeon’s The Tanks at Flers, 
two recent and detailed accounts, 
supply context that helps clarify 
the references to the tanks in the 
Canadian war diaries. 
 Following a sharp bombardment 
at 0620 hours, the Canadians went 
“over the top” and advanced across 
the cratered moonscape in front of 
Courcelette towards the German 
lines. Gunner Eric Blake, a tank 
gunner at Flers-Courcelette, vividly 
recalled the terrain confronting 
attacking troops of the Fourth and 
Reserve armies on 15 September 1916. 
You never saw such a sight as the 
countryside is now — one mass of 
shell-holes everywhere you look. 
The woods are blown to pieces, and 
only a few branchless stumps remain 
of must have once been fine thickets. 
As for the towns and villages, they 
simply don’t exist now…[there was] 
practically not a brick standing on 
another.47
Canadian infantry  and tanks 
laboriously advanced over the pock-
marked ground as quick as they 
could to “hug” the creeping barrage 
and overwhelm German soldiers 
before they could man their posts. 
This unforgiving terrain presented 
serious obstacles to the ungainly 
tanks as they slowly crawled over the 
heavily-cratered fields. 
 The 28th Battalion of the 6th 
CIB formed the left flank of the 2nd 
Canadian Division and advanced with 
three tanks towards Sugar Trench. 
The battalion’s war diary commented 
that two tanks got stuck shortly after 
the advance began. Both of these 
tanks were unable to advance past 
the Canadian front lines. It appears 
that the rear steering mechanism on 
tank C.3, “Chartreuse,” was hit by 
shrapnel, and the tank eventually 
drove into a shell hole from which 
it could not be recovered. Similarly, 
C.4, “Chablis,” experienced trouble 
when its tracks became loose and 
fell off the caterpillar mechanism.48 
Some troops were detached to try 
and get the tanks moving again, but 
“the attempt was futile.”49 The 28th 
Battalion lost sight of the third tank, 
but nevertheless captured its final 
objectives by 0820 hours. Despite 
the brisk advance, the battalion 
suffered terrible casualties. It lost 
ten officers and three hundred other 
ranks during the attack, roughly 30 
percent of the 1,029 casualties of all 
ranks suffered by the 6th CIB during 
the assault, and a testament to the 
ferocity of the 45th Reserve Division’s 
defence of Courcelette.50 
 Also in the 6th CIB attack were 
the troops of the 31st Battalion 
who were assigned “mopping 
up” duty during the attack. Its 
platoons were dispersed amongst 
the other battalions of the brigade to 
consolidate captured trenches and 
eliminate any German strongpoints 
bypassed by the initial assault.51 One 
of the members of the unit, Private 
Donald Fraser, wrote vividly of the 
attack, in which members of the 6th 
CIB became quickly pinned-down 
in no-man’s-land by intense German 
machine gun and rifle fire. Several 
of the platoon commanders who 
attempted to lead their men forward 
were immediately shot down as they 
raised themselves above the lips of 
craters. Fraser wrote that “the assault 
was a failure and now we were at the 
mercy of the enemy.” When the men 
appeared to give up hope, the third 
tank unseen by the 28th Battalion 
lumbered into view and immediately 
began firing on German positions. It 
was tank C.5, “Crème de Menthe,”52 
commanded by Captain Arthur 
Inglis, a former infantry officer 
detached from the Gloucestershire 
Regiment for service in the Heavy 
Branch, commanding No.1 Section 
of “C” Company.53 Fraser wrote 
that Crème de Menthe immediately 
“gave new life and vigour to our 
men,” who were inspired to renew 
the attack and follow Inglis’ tank “as 
if to be in on the kill.”54 Inspired by 
the tanks, the infantry advanced and 
captured the German trench. Private 
Joseph Thompson wrote that upon 
seeing tanks grind over the German 
positions, “the men thought that 
this was such fun and quick work 
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ahead” in the next phase of the attack, 
“which was readily given.”55
 Despite the crucial impetus 
generated by the timely appearance 
of Crème de Menthe, the 31st 
Battalion suffered dreadful losses 
on 15 September. Less than half 
the battalion, 318 out of 722 men, 
answered roll call after the attack.56 
The 6th CIB narrative concurred 
with Fraser’s evaluation of the 
tank’s importance, stating that 
Crème de Menthe “proved of much 
assistance in enabling our troops to 
advance towards their objective.”57 
Following the infantry’s capture of 
their objectives, Crème de Menthe 
returned to its start line for refuelling 
and the two ditched tanks were 
salvaged.58 Inglis was awarded 
the Distinguished Service Order 
(DSO) for “reaching his objective and 
manoeuvring throughout the whole 
operation.”59 
Above: The ruins of the Sugar Factory 
photographed shortly after the battle.
Right: “The Capture of the Sugar Refinery 
at Courcelette by the Canadians on 
September 15, 1916” by Fortunino 
Matania. This dramatic re-creation of 
the Canadian action to capture the 
Sugar Factory faithfully captures the 
actual battlefield – compare to the 
photo above.
Below right: A close-up of an ad-hoc 
bunker created by the Germans out 





































McEwen: Tanks at the Battle of Flers-Courcelette
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2011
16
 Sources from the 4th CIB do 
not provide as much detail on the 
performance of tanks, but a range of 
evidence indicates that its experience 
on 15 September closely resembled 
that of the 6th CIB. The 21st Battalion 
formed the left flank of the 4th CIB 
and was tasked with assaulting the 
Sugar Factory. In the words of a 
brigade report, the refinery “was 
known to be a strong position and 
it was expected would be defended 
with determination.”60
 The battalion began its attack 
at zero hour and swiftly captured 
the first German line. The creeping 
barrage was effective: “no difficulty 
was experienced taking [the] first 
line trench as our Artillery had 
demoral ized  what  occupants 
remained there.”61 As the battalion 
continued its advance it began to 
take heavy casualties from machine 
gun positions in the Sugar Factory 
and the surrounding trenches. One 
of the three tanks assigned to the 4th 
CIB was seen by troops of the 21st 
Battalion moving slowly towards 
Sugar Trench, but the other two tanks 
were out of sight. In accordance with 
the general order to maintain the 
tempo of the advance, the battalion 
began its assault on the Sugar Factory 
without waiting for the ungainly 
tanks to appear, and eliminated all 
opposition after a sharp fight. The 
battalion captured its final objective 
around 0703 hours and took 125 
prisoners.62 The war diary noted that 
“the battalion advanced well ahead 
of the Tanks and the final objective 
was gained before tanks overtook 
them.”63 The stiff German resistance 
took its toll on the 21st, which could 
only muster 200 all ranks and four 
machine guns to defend its newly 
won positions against counterattack.64 
 The 21st Battalion attack is 
instructive in the overall experience 
of the 4th CIB on the morning of 15 
September. The other battalions in the 
brigade convey almost no information 
on the role of the tanks during 
the initial assault. This suggests 
that the infantry battalions either 
did not appreciate any assistance 
rendered by the tanks, or that there 
were not enough tanks operating 
in their sectors to warrant mention. 
Nevertheless, the brigade war diary 
commented vaguely that on the 
morning of 15 September the tanks 
“assisted in taking of some enemy 
positions.”65 Similar to the events 
in the 6th CIB sector, two out of the 
three tanks assigned to the 4th CIB 
failed to cross the Canadian front 
line. C.1, “Champagne,” became 
stuck in the mud and its tracks turned 
without any traction, forcing the 
crew to eventually abandon it. C.2, 
“Cognac,” was lost after becoming 
stuck in a shell hole. 66 The remaining 
tank, Second Lieutenant John Allan’s 
C.6, “Cordon Rouge,” straddled 
a German trench and poured 
murderous enfilade fire down both 
lengths of the line.67 Cordon Rouge’s 
valuable assistance in attacking 
the German trench brought the 4th 
CIB war diary to comment that the 
Canadian troops cheer Cordon Rouge (C.6) after the battle. The horseshoe affixed to the front of the tank provided the good luck 
needed for the tank to complete its mission of 15 September. Cordon Rouge supported the attack by the 4th Canadian Infantry 
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tanks “proved their value” in their 
first action.68 Allan was awarded the 
Military Cross (MC).69 
 Following the attacks of the 
6th and 4th CIBs, the tanks’ role in 
the battle for Courcelette was over. 
Buoyed by the initial successes, 
Major-General Turner committed the 
5th CIB for an assault on Courcelette 
itself in the late afternoon of 15 
September. The 22nd and 25th 
Battalions attacked at 1815 hours 
without tank support and captured 
the village by 1900 hours. The 
capture of Courcelette did not end 
the battle, for the 22nd had to repel 
13 counterattacks over the next two 
days.70
 One common feature of the 
reports is the shock the tanks had on 
German defenders. Fierce debates 
raged immediately after the battle 
over the supposed loss of the tanks’ 
novelty value due to a “premature 
disclosure” of their existence at 
Flers-Courcelette. 71 On the other 
hand, recent research by Christy 
Campbell suggests that the Germans 
were aware that some kind of new 
armoured fighting vehicle was about 
to debut on the battlefield on the basis 
of espionage reports from Britain.72 
 The sense of many Canadian 
reports is that the enemy infantry 
received a rude shock on the morning 
of 15 September. Captain Macintyre 
recorded that several Germans 
“surrendered on [the tanks’] approach 
and one remarked that it was not war 
but ‘savage butchery.’”73 Many of the 
Germans were surprised at the tanks’ 
resistance to machine gun fire, which 
would not stop the machines unless 
hit by armour-piercing SmK bullets 
fired by Mauser rifles.74 Private 
Fraser wrote with a certain degree of 
satisfaction that his erstwhile German 
tormentors “got out of their trench 
and were beating it back over the 
open, terrified at the approach of the 
tank.”75 This severe blow to German 
morale in front of Courcelette was 
evidently as much appreciated by 
the infantry as any physical support 
offered by the tanks. Despite the fact 
that only two of the six tanks in action 
with the 2nd Canadian Division 
actually engaged German troops, the 
4th CIB narrative commented that 
“the advance of this new offensive 
weapon had much to do with the 
success of the operation.”76 
 The Canadian high command 
was not so enthusiastic. The fact that 
only one third of the tanks committed 
to the attack on Courcelette were able 
to render assistance indicated that 
tanks were not a decisive weapon. 
The tanks’ performance essentially 
validated the concerns of prudent 
battalion and brigade commanders 
who viewed the new weapons with 
caution. Lieutenant-General Byng 
concluded that “tanks are a useful 
accessory to the infantry, but nothing 
more.”77 
 Byng’s remarks offer probably 
the most balanced assessment of the 
tanks’ capabilities after their first test 
of combat. It is important to keep in 
mind that throughout the planning 
process, tanks were only supposed 
to be adjuncts to the infantry assault. 
Indeed, the fact that units were 
ordered not to wait for tanks in the 
event they were delayed or bogged 
down showed that commanding 
officers anticipated problems with the 
new weapons in their first field test. 
In the Canadian experience, tanks 
performed exactly as expected: not 
depended upon for success but able 
to assist the infantry wherever they 
could. 
The British XV Corps Attack
The experience of British XV Corps’ at Flers closely reflected that of 
the Canadians at Courcelette. Both 
corps saw a handful of tanks advance 
in the support of infantry and deliver 
assistance at critical junctures against 
stiff German resistance. The glowing 
praise of the tanks’ performance by 
Canadian troops who saw them in 
action was mirrored by bubbling 
enthusiasm from British and New 
Zealand troops. The British XV Corps 
attack similarly showed that even if 
most of the tanks failed to advance 
across no-man’s-land, the remaining 
few were able to intervene decisively 
in places where the infantry had been 
stalled by tenacious resistance.
 Because of delays in the shipment 
of essential equipment from Britain 
and mechanical failures, only 26 of 
the 42 tanks assigned to Fourth Army 
were available on the morning of 15 
September.78 In contrast to the 900 
metre advance of the Canadian Corps 
to its objectives, most units of the 
Fourth Army had to advance more 
than 3,500 metres to capture their 
first-day objectives, Gueudecourt, 
Lesboeufs and Morval.79 General 
Rawlinson ordered the tanks to 
advance approximately five minutes 
ahead of the infantry in order to 
soften up German defences. This, as 
noted above, required the artillery 
to leave 90-metre-wide gaps in the 
creeping barrage for each section of 
three or four tanks.80 In the event that 
the tanks were destroyed or ditched, 
these gaps in the bombardment 
would leave stretches of German 
trench untouched by the barrage, 
making the attacking infantry 
vulnerable. Nevertheless, the infantry 
were directed “on no account” to wait 
for the tanks if they lagged behind or 
were knocked out.81 
 The two units in the Fourth Army 
that had the greatest success with the 
tanks were Major-General Sydney 
Lawford’s 41st British and Major-
General Andrew Russell’s New 
Zealand divisions of the XV British 
Corps. They attacked beside each 
other in the drive towards Flers and 
Gueudecourt,82 and their experience 
with the tanks was comparable to that 
Canadian 2nd Division. 
 The New Zealanders, assigned 
four tanks, went over the top at 0620 
hours and immediately came under 
intense German fire. The varied 
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effectiveness of the creeping barrage 
meant that some battalions were 
confronted with uncut wire directly 
in their path, while others suffered 
dreadfully from enfilade fire on 
their flanks. The 3rd Battalion of the 
New Zealand Rifle Brigade (NZRB) 
ran into stout German resistance at 
Flers Trench, immediately west of 
the village. It was unable to advance 
into the storm of German fire and 
decided to wait for tank assistance. 
The brigade’s history notes that at 
1030 hours, two tanks — Lieutenant 
Herbert Pearsall’s D.11 and Captain 
Graeme Nixon’s D.1283 — arrived to 
assist the beleaguered infantry. The 
left-hand tank, D.11, provided flank 
support while D.12 “proceeded to 
deal with the wire and machine-
guns holding up our men.”84 The 3rd 
Battalion was then able to surmount 
German opposition and capture 
Flers Trench. The New Zealanders 
fell short of the ultimate objective 
of Gueudecourt, but were able to 
advance to the third objective of 
Abbey Road Trench by 1100 hours.85 
Their roughly 2,230 metre push was 
one of the farthest advances of any 
division on 15 September.86 
Left: Soldiers of the New Zealand 
Division stand in a front line trench near 
Flers, 15 September 1916.
Below: Tank D.17 (Dinnaken) supported 
the British attack on Flers. It advanced 
up the main street of the village and 
materially assisted its capture by directly 
engaging numerous German machine 
gun positions. After its armament was 
disabled, the tank was able to make 
its way back to safety. Here, a group of 
British soldiers pose with D.17 following 
the battle.
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 D.11 and D.12 were the only tanks 
able to help the New Zealanders on 
15 September, the other two being 
disabled by German fire.87 The actions 
of these two tanks nevertheless 
received glowing praise from most 
of the New Zealand regimental 
histories of the battle. The NZRB 
history by Lieutenant-Colonel W.S. 
Austin states that the tanks “came 
well up to expectations.”88 Despite 
the heavy casualties suffered by the 
Otago Regiment’s 2nd Battalion, the 
regimental history by Lieutenant 
Arthur Byrne concludes that the tanks 
“did actually perform extraordinarily 
effective work” by “breathing death 
and destruction.”89 
 Attacking on the right flank of 
the New Zealanders on 15 September 
was the British 41st Division. It was 
tasked with capturing the village of 
Flers and pushing on to Gueudecourt 
by the end of the day. In the early 
stages of the 15 September attacks, 
the 15th Battalion of the Hampshire 
Regiment (15/Hampshire) of the 
British 122nd Infantry Brigade noted 
in its war diary that the tanks’ slow 
speed meant they originally “did 
not do much except perhaps cause 
alarm in the second enemy line.”90 
In what is perhaps the most notable 
tank action of the day, however, 
Second Lieutenant Stuart Hastie’s 
D.17, “Dinnaken,” advanced with a 
group of 122nd Brigade troops up 
the main street of Flers.91 The 15/
Hampshire war diary states that at 
this time “one of the armoured cars 
[sic] did most useful work smashing 
in the enemy’s Strong Points and…
also gave the men great confidence.”92 
(Hastie was awarded the MC for the 
action.93)
 The advance began to bog down 
shortly thereafter. According to the 
15/Hampshire war diary, beyond 
Flers “organized attack had ceased, 
owing to formations having been 
broken up, and to heavy casualties 
among the officers.”94 The battalion 
alone suffered 292 casualties of 
all ranks on 15 September.95 These 
were comparable to the losses of the 
heavily engaged Canadian and New 
Zealand battalions, evidence of the 
ferocity of the action all across the 
front on 15 September. Ultimately, 
Rawlinson postponed future attacks 
due to the stiff German resistance 
and heavy casualties. The most 
distant British first day objective, 
Gueudecourt, would not in fact be 
taken until 26 September.96
 Reports from units of the British 
XV Corps about the demoralizing 
effects of tanks upon the enemy 
echo those from the Canadians to 
the west. According to the history 
of New Zealand’s Otago Regiment 
the tanks instilled “fear of a kind 
hitherto unknown into those of 
the enemy who encountered it.”97 
Similarly, the 15/Hampshire war 
diary commented that the tanks’ 
assaul t  on  German posi t ions 
“without doubt” demoralized 
whatever soldiers attempted to resist 
the onslaught.98 Gunner Eric Blake 
remarked that the tanks’ “moral 
effect on Fritz the first time we 
went into action was undoubted.”99 



































Another view of D.17 following the battle.  The tank remained in location here for several days before being recovered. It was used 
as a brigade headquarters during this period. Here the brigadier (with cane) and his staff pose for a photo during a lull in the battle.
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understood as accurate reports of the 
German reaction, or the headiness of 
victorious troops who had survived 
ferocious combat is difficult to say. 
Still, the consistency of accounts from 
Canadian, British and New Zealand 
sources suggest that the tanks’ debut 
administered a severe shock to the 
German defenders. 
Aftermath
The battle largely bogged down after 15 September. Heavy rains 
began to deluge the battlefield and 
troops found it increasingly difficult 
to move up food and supplies, let 
alone attack, in the flooded mire.100 
Uncoordinated assaults continued, 
but the offensive at Flers-Courcelette 
did not reach beyond the first day’s 
objectives.101 Haig’s desire to smash 
German lines and let the cavalry 
wreak havoc in the enemy’s rear 
remained unrealized. The costs of 
the battle were heavy. The Canadians 
suffered 7,230 casualties in the week-
long battle.102 The New Zealanders 
lost 100 officers and 3,000 enlisted 
men by 19 September.103 Precise 
German casualties are unknown 
but 4,000 prisoners were captured 
over the course of the battle.104 Flers-
Courcelette became just one more 
grinding advance in the attritional 
abyss of the Somme.
 Nevertheless, Haig appeared 
pleased with the results. The capture 
of Courcelette, Martinpuich and 
Flers on 15 September led him to 
write that the battle witnessed 
“more considerable” gains than any 
operation “since the commencement 
of the offensive.”105 He was especially 
pleased with the performance of the 
tanks. He remarked that “wherever 
the tanks advanced we took our 
objectives, and wherever they did 
not advance we failed.”106 This 
statement is rather general and not 
strictly true, for British infantry of the 
47th Division captured High Wood 
without tank support. However, 
his remarks are useful in conveying 
his enthusiasm for the tanks. On 
17 September Haig wrote that he 
“decided to ask the home authorities 
to send us out as quickly as many 
[tanks] as possible.”107 
 Not  everyone agreed that 
the tanks were a success on 15 
September. The fact that only two 
of the six tanks assigned to the 
2nd Canadian Division, and two 
out of the four detailed to assist 
the New Zealand Division, were 
able to cross the start line indicates 
that significant improvements in 
tactics and technology would be 
required for the tanks to become 
truly effective. Years later Winston 
Churchill complained bitterly of the 
lost novelty of the tanks “for the mere 
petty purpose of taking a few ruined 
villages.”108 Lieutenant-Colonel 
Courcelette after the battle.
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Swinton wrote acidly after the war 
that “we threw away a surprise…
in the vain hope of resuscitating the 
momentum of an offensive which had 
died away.”109 Nevertheless, Swinton 
added that the tanks “fully justified 
themselves” in the battle.110 Haig was 
undeterred by the loss of surprise and 
ordered a thousand more machines 
for immediate production.111
 Following the action at Flers-
Courcelette, the fighting on the Somme 
degenerated into a series of localized 
attacks that became increasingly 
costly in men and material. When 
the bloody offensive finally drew 
to a close on 19 November, the BEF 
had sustained approximately 432,000 
casualties for the gain of only a few 
kilometres at the deepest penetration 
of German lines.112 The Canadians 
would not advance much more than 
they did on 15 September. They lost 
16,800 more men on the Somme in 
a series of attacks against German 
trenches along the Ancre Heights.113 
The five-month struggle was known 
to the Germans as a Materialschlacht, 
or “battle of material,” a term which 
reflects the brutally attritional nature 
of the Great War as it progressed into 
its fourth year.114
 Ultimately, the debut of tanks at 
Flers-Courcelette demonstrated their 
tactical capabilities. They did not live 
up to the high hopes of Swinton and 
Churchill, not least because their 
deployment in limited numbers 
did not afford the same shock as a 
massed assault. Nevertheless, they 
did meet expectations as a tactical 
weapon in support of the infantry. 
The infantry were told not to rely 
upon tanks, so were not all that 
surprised when they broke down. 
Still, when tanks were able to render 
assistance, as with Crème de Menthe, 
they often did so in the intended 
manner: helping beleaguered infantry 
overcome German strongpoints in 
order to capture an objective. Byng’s 
assessment that they were a “useful 
accessory to the infantry but nothing 
more” aptly captures the tanks’ 
capabilities during the 15 September 
attack. Tanks would be deployed in 
small, isolated numbers throughout 
the rest of the Somme offensive, but 
their participation was nowhere as 
noticeable or celebrated as their debut 
at Flers-Courcelette.
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